Crisis negotiation, deadlines and complexity

The field of crisis negotiation has developed rapidly since the poorly managed Munich Olympics hostage crisis in 1972. A general trend has been towards seeking better understanding of human behaviour. This understanding often allows negotiators to resolve crisis events in ways that carry much lower risk than the traditional approach of forceful intervention.

One of the key techniques involves intentional and informed management of time to facilitate a weakening of perpetrators’ resolve. What seemed like a good idea on day one of a siege may not seem equally appealing after days or weeks of uneventful inactivity and lack of progress. With the passing of time, the initial heightened emotions and inflated expectations of success de-escalate and tend to get replaced with fatigue, exhaustion, boredom, hunger and despair.

It is then interesting to read the article on BBC today where Ukraine’s interior minister proposed to resolve the present hostage crisis by establishing a 48h deadline for resolving the crisis with “either talk or force”. This strategy would seem at odds with recent thinking in crisis negotiation, and actually opens up a wide range of undesirable risks, including:

  • While stalling for time serves to defuse emotions and increase rationality, the introduction of deadlines instead increases stress and emotions, which in turn increases the risk of rushed, impulsive and unpredictable decisions.
  • Imposing a deadline is an overt display of power, and the hope is to motivate submission. But more often than not the use of power instead motivates resentment, resistance, revenge, escalation and even mutual destruction. Power is often an element in crisis negotiations, but due to the negative by-products it creates, power is often introduced gradually by negotiators and primarily for the purpose of motivating a continuation of negotiations. In contrast an ultimatum introduces maximum power in one hit, and is more likely to result in a fight or flight response.
  • Note that in this case Ukraine has effectively imposed the deadline on itself – not just on the activists. And Ukraine has in the process reduced the number of available options for resolution by locking itself into one course of action. This is a legitimate strategy from a game theory perspective. But from a negotiation perspective there is now a risk that the pro-Russian activists will test the deadline. If the deadline passes, and Ukraine doesn’t use force, then the Ukraine’s power of any similar threats in the future, even in unrelated negotiations, will be severely reduced. Thus by imposing the ultimatum Ukraine has significantly increased the likelihood of a forceful resolution to the crisis. And use of force may be particularly undesirable given the current political context in Ukraine.

Of course, we have to be careful to not assume that we know Ukraine’s motivation behind the strategy. If the goal is to resolve the situation with minimum risk of losing lives then we might question the strategy as above. But if the goal different, e.g. to end the siege swiftly for political reasons in order to better manage local and international constituents, then there is of course more rationale for the strategy.

International crises are very complex. Here we focused on one small piece, and that is the impact of deadlines and ultimatums on the likelihood of peaceful resolutions with barricaded perpetrators.

Let’s see how it pans out!

Proof that influence is counterintuitive

(This is a repost from Filip’s original blog)

I consistently tell people that we (as in “human beings”) are all bad at negotiation.

But why do I keep trying to bring everyone (including myself!) down? Doesn’t this statement risk causing disagreement, resistance or friction? And if so, wouldn’t that constitute bad negotiation behaviour on my part? Absolutely! That is a very valid point; skilled negotiators rarely cause disagreement, and only do so if it serves a specific purpose.

Fortunately, in this case it does serve a purpose. The purpose is to help people realize that effective negotiation behaviour is counterintuitive. We typically do not adopt new and counterintuitive behaviour without first experiencing a shock to our system. In lectures that shock is called the AHA! moment, where participants suddenly realize that something they have been doing for the last 20-50 years causes rather than resolves problems between themselves and others.

Unfortunately you and I don’t have the opportunity to share a lecture theatre, so how else can I create this AHA! moment for you? How about I give you a piece of carefully designed homework?

…and I just lost 50% of my readers 😉

For the rest of you, the homework is as follows: The next time you in an angry state write an email response someone else, I want you to try the following:

  1. Create a new email.
  2. Write your response.
  3. Don’t send the email, instead save it as a draft.
  4. Repeat steps 1-3 ten times.
  5. Then compare version 10 with version 1.

My prediction is that version 1 will be comparatively more focused on you, how you feel, the problem you perceive, why you are right, and the selective evidence that supports your arguments. Writing this email will make you feel better. But sending this email will make you feel something else; most likely regret.

In contrast, version 10 will have more focus on both parties, commonalities, and how the process can move forward towards agreement and outcomes. Version 10 will also have less inflammatory language, accusations, projections, transference, and other forms of pollution that predictably cause negotiations to derail. Sending this version of the email is more likely to get you your desired outcome.

So how does this prove that influence is counterintuitive? Well, you just proved it to yourself! I haven’t seen your ten versions, but I know that you will agree that version 10 is more influential than version 1. I suspect that you will even agree that your first response, i.e. your intuitive response, would have done a terrible job of helping you get your desired outcome.

Now, when writing emails we can afford 10 attempts to improve on our initial, intuitive response. But how many attempts do we get in our face-to-face interactions..? Oh, that’s right, just the one… Ouch!

If only there was something we could do to improve that unrehearsed first version of our face-to-face interaction with others… What if there was a book that we could read? A book that could serve as our companion on a life long journey towards outstanding negotiation performance…? 😉